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Understanding Hard and Soft IS Development Methods: Paradigmatic Rigidities
or Different Ends of a Spectrum?
Stephen K. Probert, Cranfield University, U.K., s.k.probert@rmcs.cranfield.ac.uk
Athena Rogers, John Moores University, U.K., a.a.rogers@livjm.ac.uk
Abstract
Moving from using hard to soft IS methods (tools,
techniques, etc.) is usually characterised as involving a
paradigm shift from positivistic / functionalistic thinking
to interpretive thinking. Using ideas from contemporary
epistemology, we propose that such a shift should be re-
conceptualised as a movement along an epistemological
spectrum (or continuum), rather than being a dichotomous
shift. As IS practitioners make such “shifts” (or
movements) in practice, we argue that our proposed
epistemological continuum would aid IS researchers in
understanding such movements and their pragmatic
consequences.
Introduction
According to IS researchers such as Hirschheim, t al.
(1995) and Gammack (1995), systems analysis and design
practitioners consistently move beyond their (typical)
positivistic / functionalistic IS education and embrace
interpretive thinking:
“[I]f one looks at the textbooks on data modelling and
IS development which form the basis of university
teaching, they are virtually entirely functionalist in
orientation: functionalist methodologies, adopting
functionalist ontological and epistemological
assumptions … We teach it to our students … The
students upon graduation, in turn, apply it in practice.
However, in applying it to practice, it is likely that the
shortcomings of functionalist approaches surface… If
our philosophical journey - metaphorically speaking –
to reach beyond functionalism has any merit, it is
because many practitioners have also embarked on a
journey arriving at the same place, but they do not
know where they are or how they got there. They just
got there, driven to it by struggling with and
confronting the complexity of systems development.
Indeed, these practitioners have learned, often
intuitively and through learning from experience, that
functionalist tenets are an insufficient basis on which
to develop and implement information systems.”
(Hirschheim, et al., 1995:237)
Indeed, they may use IS methodologies’ “best-bits” in
order to arrive at the required “solution” etc. (Gammack,
1995). Within the academic IS field this may sometimes
equate to a (problematic) shifting between philosophical
paradigms (Hirschheim, et al., 1995). No doubt most
practitioners are largely unaware of their “crime”, but
many IS theorists recoil at such casual methodological
application (e.g. Doyle and Wood, 1991). As it is
probably impractical to advocate obliterating the
“paradigm-thinking” upon which so much of the
academic discipline of IS is based, it will be argued that
recent (Anglo-Saxon) epistemology may be employed to re-
interpret the (supposed) dichotomy between the positivist /
functionalist and interpretive paradigms – at least insofar as
epistemological differences are concerned. This work will
be primarily informed by Haack (1993).
Contemporary Epistemology
In contemporary epistemology, a distinction is usually
made between foundationalist and coherentist accounts of
epistemology. In essence, the distinction is concerned with
the question as to whether any beliefs are privileged over
others. It will be argued that both hard and soft approaches
adopt predominantly foundationalist strategies. It is doubtful
whether coherentist approaches could be sensibly employed
within systems analysis, as such approaches are not
intended to explain the acquisition of “piecemeal”
knowledge, “The characteristic theses of coherentist theories
of justification are that justification is exclusively a matter
of relations among beliefs, and that it is the coherence of
beliefs within a set which justifies the member beliefs.”
(Haack, 1993:17). The “nearest thing” to an example of a
coherentist strategy in IS analysis might be the prescriptions
to carry out “cross-referencing” between different products,
as should be done when using the UK’s Structured Systems
Analysis and Design Method (SSADM), for example. If
anomalies are generated during the cross-referencing
process then this would require some further analysis to be
carried out to rectify the situation. However, no
methodology (of which the authors are presently aware)
relies entirely on the procedure of cross-referencing to
generate the “true” requirements. Faith in such a procedure
would imply that because cross-referencing between
different products can be successfully carried out it follows
that the products resulting from the analysis of the
information system are entirely correct – clearly a very
dubious proposition. What actually happens in such
approaches would seem to be that the “elementary”
elements of analysis (DFDs, entity models, etc) are seen to
be epistemologically foundational - but fallible. Cross-
referencing exposes some of the errors made during
“elementary” (i.e. foundational) analysis.
Foundational Epistemology
Foundationalist epistemologies assume that some beliefs
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are “privileged” (fundamental, or more basic) than others:
“... [A] theory qualifies as foundationalist which
subscribes to the theses:
(FD1) Some justified beliefs are basic; a basic belief is
justified independently of the support of any other
belief;
and:
(FD2) All other justified beliefs are derived; a derived
belief is justified via the support, direct or indirect, of a
basic belief or beliefs.” (Haack, 1993:14).
Both IS approaches (hard and soft) subscribe to this
thesis; it is in which type of beliefs that they privilege that
their real differences lie. Haack finds that there are many
variants of foundationalism. The two which are of most
importance in this analysis are (what she characterises as):
1. The experientialist version of empirical foundationalism.
2. The extrinsic version of empirical foundationalism.
Here, ‘empiricist’ should not be assumed to be
‘objectivist’, “‘Empirical’, here, should be understood as
roughly equivalent to ‘factual’, not as necessarily restricted
to beliefs about the external world... one style of empirical
foundationalism [the experientialist version] takes beliefs
about the subject’s own, current, conscious states as basic,
another [the extrinsic version] takes simple beliefs about the
external world as basic...” (Haack, 1993:15).
The Foundationalist Spectrum
It can now be concluded that, broadly speaking, soft
approaches assume the experientialist version to be the case,
whilst the hard approaches assume the extrinsic version to
be the case:
“...[A]ccording to the experientialist version of empirical
foundationalism, basic beliefs are justified, not by the
support of other beliefs, but by the support of the
subject’s (sensory and/or introspective) experience;
according to the extrinsic version of empirical
foundationalism, basic beliefs are justified because of
the existence of a causal or law-like connection between
the subject’s having the belief and the state of affairs
which makes it true...” (Haack, 1993:15).
Now, what is one to make of a statement such as thisi:
“With regard to epistemology we may identify two
extreme positions of positivism and interpretivism.
Positivism is characterised by a belief in the existence of
causal relationships and general laws that may be
identified and investigated through rational action. In
contrast, interpretivism allows that no individual account
of reality can ever be proven as more correct than
another since we are unable to compare them against
any objective knowledge of a ‘true’ reality.” (Lewis,
1994:138).
The ‘extreme’ called ‘positivism’ may be identified with
the extrinsic version of empirical foundationalism, and the
‘extreme’ called ‘interpretivism’ may be identified with the
experientialist version of empirical foundationalism.
However, these positions should not be presented as being
in binary opposition to each other; both are variants of
foundationalism. Furthermore, the more general distinction
between foundationalism and coherentism does not even get
a mention in such accounts. Moreover, there are many
“variations on these themes” within contemporary
epistemology; and Haack finds that within foundationalism
there are four basic variants of both coherentism and
foundationalism (some of which are further subdivided).
However, these variants need not be discussed further in this
work.
Conclusion
The proposed reorientation in the way we, as
researchers, think about IS would allow IS developers to
unproblematically make use of both positivistic /
functionalistic thinking and interpretive thinking as their
need to manage and define information systems dictates.
We would certainly agree with Hirschheim, et al. vis a
vis practitioners’ experiences (discussed earlier); where
we would disagree with them is in their rendering of
different versions of empirical foundationalism as being
different philosophical paradigms. We have argued that
these “dichotomies” are extreme ends of the
foundationalist continuum along which system developers
can migrate – and this philosophical journey may begin
from either end of the spectrumii. To answer the question:
Does this mean that these dichotomies should not exist?
we would respond - no. It is not the dichotomies which
hinder our progression, it is the way we view them in
opposition to each other, rather than considering them as
being at the extreme ends of a spectrum. In fact, the full
spectrum of epistemological standpoints lies between
extreme coherentism and extreme foundationalism.
Following Haack (1993), we are arguing that objective
judgements always call for the uncritical acceptance of
certain standards as to what is - and what is not to count as
evidence; correspondingly, subjective judgements about
what is the case - whilst lacking standards for their complete
acceptance - give indications as to what might be the case
(i.e. they are truth-indicative). However, Haack also argues
that powerful elements of the coherentist thesis should also
be included in a reconstructed epistemology (she calls this
‘foundherentism’). Such an approach as Haack suggests
would both advocate and enhance the value of any cross-
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referencing procedures that could be developed between the
two approaches to IS analysis (hard and soft), and this
(arguably important) issue is rarely discussed in
philosophical IS research papers.
Whilst further discussion lies outside the scope of the
present work it can be concluded that the epistemological
differences can sensibly be reconciled by admitting:
1. The truth-indicative nature of bona fide subjective
judgements about what appears to be the case.
2. The ineliminably subjective nature of objective
judgements about what is the case.
Such a view would, at any rate, appear to be endorsed by
some of those reflectively engaged in IS practice, such as
Gammack - who concludes that, “...[S]ubjectivity and
objectivity exist as extremes on a continuum where the
difference between them is one of degree rather than of
kind.” (Gammack, 1995:181). We conclude that such a
continuity should be formally recognised. Work is in
progress, both to provide methodological guidelines in order
to operationalise IS development along such a continuum,
and to provide guidelines to indicate how relevant aspects of
the coherentist thesis may be employed to improve IS
practice and research.
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Notes
                                                     
i From Paul Lewis’s 1994 book. Lewis is one of the very
few IS development textbook authors to take the
interpretivist paradigm seriously.
ii  Although we would agree with Hirschheim, et al. (1995)
that presently this movement will generally be from hard
to soft, owing to the dominance of “functionalist” IS
textbooks and research papers.
